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The research aims to investigate whether the monetary and fiscal policies in Indonesia interact with each other as well 
as the effect of twin shock on the coordination. The study employs the cointegration analysis and Error Correction 
Model (ECM) to estimate quarterly data from 2001:1 to 2016:4. The study has found the existence of consolidated 
government budget constraint (GBC) that links the activities of fiscal authority (taxing, spending, and issuing the 
bond) with the activities of the monetary authority in the short and long run. The study also found the coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policies both in the short and long run. It is found that the short-run fiscal policy was 
influenced by the long-run shock of the exchange rate and the short-run monetary policy was influenced by the short 
and long-run shock of the price level. The study shows the importance of policy coordination in the currency and 
budget deficit management.
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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menyelidik sama ada dasar fiskal dan monetari di Indonesia bertinteraksi antara satu 
sama lain dan menyelidik kesan kejutan berkembar terhadap koordinasi tersebut. Kajian ini menggunakan analisis 
kointegrasi dan Model Pembetulan Ralat (ECM) untuk menganggarkan data suku tahun  dari 2001:1 hingga 2016:4. 
Kajian ini mendapati wujudnya kekangan belanjawan kerajaan yang disatukan (GBC) yang menghubungkan aktiviti 
pihak berkuasa fiskal (mengenakan cukai, perbelanjaan, dan mengeluarkan bon) dengan aktiviti pihak berkuasa 
monetari dalam jangka pendek dan jangka panjang. Kajian ini juga mendapati terdapat koordinasi antara dasar 
monetari dan fiskal dalam jangka pendek dan jangka panjang. Didapati bahawa dasar fiskal jangka pendek dipengaruhi 
oleh kejutan kadar pertukaran jangka panjang dan dasar monetari jangka pendek dipengaruhi oleh kejutan tingkat 
harga jangka pendek dan jangka panjang. Kajian ini menunjukkan pentingnya penyelarasan dasar dalam pengurusan 
mata wang dan belanjawan defisit.
Kata kunci; Dasar fiskal; dasar monetari; koordinasi dasar; interaksi dasa; error correction model
INTRODUCTION
Bank Indonesia (BI) fell under the cabinet’s 
responsibilities since its establishment in 1953 until 
1999. Since Law no. 23/1999 concerning BI (effective 
May 17, 1999) was applied, BI has had full autonomy 
in terms of formulating and carrying out its duties and 
authorities (including autonomy from government 
interference) in carrying out its roles and functions as 
monetary authorities more effectively and efficiently. 
Bank Indonesia focuses on the stability of the value of 
the currency (Rupiah) both internally (against inflation) 
and externally (against the exchange rate). Since 2001 
BI began to socialize inflation targeting (ITF) and in 
2005 fully implemented it. The ITF framework has 
succeeded in reducing inflation, driving economic 
growth, and lowering interest rates (Warjiyo & Juhro 
2016: 362).
The 2008/2009 global financial crisis fundamentally 
changed the mandate and monetary policy (Warjiyo 
& Juhro 2016: 23). In addition to maintaining price 
stability, BI must also pay attention to macroeconomic 
stability, including output growth. Warjiyo & Juhro 
(2016: 7) stated that BI should not only achieve price 
stability but also sustainable economic growth.
The objective of fiscal policy is economic growth 
while the monetary policy is the stability of the 
currency’s value. In achieving economic stability and 
currency values, the two authorities should coordinate 
with one another. Coordination increases not only 
increase the effectiveness of fiscal but also monetary 
policy (Drazen 1985; Bruno & Fisher 1990; Blinder 
1982; Tabellini 1986; Alesina & Tabellini 1987).
Figure 1 shows the fluctuation of policy rates and 
inflation (YoY). Figure 2 shows the fluctuation of output 
and primary deficit. The output fluctuates in a year but 
the inflation fluctuates in 3 years. The data shows there 
is a positive co-movement between the fluctuation of 
the policy rates and inflation as well as negative co-
movement between the fluctuation of primary deficit 
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and output. The different pattern of co-movement and 
time of frequency implies the stabilization of output 
and inflation needs a different time horizon of policy. 
The characteristic of the fluctuation may cause fiscal 
policy and monetary policy to be uncoordinated since 
the objective of monetary policy is price stability or 
low inflation and the objective of fiscal policy is high 
output.
The shocks on price level or exchange rate might 
push the central bank to leave coordination and lose 
attention paid to output growth. This study investigates 
whether the twin shock disrupts the sustainability of 
macroeconomic policy coordination. If it turns out to 
affect policy interactions, the two authorities must be 
aware of the two shocks so as not to disturb the stability 
of the currency’s value and economic output at the same 
time.
This research is important because the studies 
on the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies 
conducted previously did not use these shocks in 
the model. With the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008, followed by the 2011 fiscal crisis in Europe, 
and the 2015 shock depreciation of the exchange rate, 
it has become clear that coordination between two 
policies is needed to avoid the economic downturn. 
This study investigates whether the exchange rate 
shocks and inflation are used by the central bank to 
be maintained, keeping fiscal and monetary policies 
away from coordination. If coordination is weakened, 
neither fiscal nor monetary policy objectives will be 
achieved.
The first step of this study is to analyze the 
monetary-fiscal policy interaction based on a model 
proposed by Chugh (2015) using the dynamic 
equilibrium approach. After finding the evidence of 
coordination, the shock of the price level and exchange 
rates was added to the model. The shock in price 
level is an internal factor while the exchange rate is 
an external factor that influences the real value of a 
domestic currency.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section 
discuses literature review that includes theoretical 
framework and previous study on the interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policy. This is followed by 
the section which discusses the data and the empirical 
strategies. The estimation results of this study are 
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FIGURE 1. Fluctuation of policy rates and inflation (YoY)
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FIGURE 2. Fluctuation of Primary Deficit and Output
Sources: BPS and BI, calculated.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There are two agents, namely fiscal and monetary 
authorities. The former controls government spending 
and taxes and the latter controls the supply of money 
(or interest rates). Chugh (2015: 244-245) describes 
each agent in turn and subsequently examines their 
interaction, including which authority sets the policy 
first and affects the policy choice of the other. In period 
t, the fiscal authority has a flow budget constraint which 
is formed as:
Pt gt + B
T




t + RCBt (1)
where Pt is price level, gt is the real amount of spending, 
Bt
T is the nominal amount of government bond at period 
t, Tt is tax, Pt
b is the price of bonds, while RCBt refers to 
the profits earned.
There also exists a budget constraint for a monetary 
authority (a central bank) that is essential for controlling 
the nominal supply of money in the economy (Mt) or 
money in circulation. The central bank can increase and 
decrease the supply of money by buying and selling 
some government bonds using open-market operations. 




t + RCBt = B
M
t-1 + Mt – Mt-1 (2)
The left-hand side consists of purchases of government 
bonds and the right-hand side represents income for the 
monetary authority. The equation consists of maturing 
bonds BMt-1, and the printing of new money, Mt - Mt-1. Mt 
- Mt-1 > 0 means the central bank prints new money and 
Mt - Mt-1 > 1 means the central bank removes money 
from circulation. 
Chugh (2015: 243) formulate the amount from 








t + Mt-1 (3)
The combination of monetary and fiscal authority 
budget constraint can be formulated as:
Pt gt + B
T










t + Mt-1 (4)
The difference between totaling the bond issue by 
the fiscal authority, Bt
T , and the bond holding by the 
monetary authority, BMt , is held by the private sector, Bt 
= Bt
T - BMt.  The equation (4) can be rewritten into:
Pt gt + Bt-1 = Tt + P
b
t Bt + Mt – Mt-1 (5)
The equation (5) is the consolidated government budget 
constraint (GBC) that links the activity of the fiscal 
authority (taxing, spending, and issuing the bond) with 
the behavior of the monetary authority. The condition 
in equation (5) must always hold in the economy to 
make both policies consistent with each other. One of 
the existing situations involves coordination between 
two authorities, active fiscal authority and passive 
monetary authority (the monetary authorities just 
choose money supply, Mt , depending on fiscal policy), 
and active monetary and passive fiscal authority (the 
fiscal authority freely chooses only two out of the three 
instruments, gt, Bt, Tt).
This study employs the intertemporal government 
budget constraint based on the consolidated GBC. The 
GBC can be formulated in real form as:
( )1 bt t t t t t
t
B
sr t g P b
P
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= . In period t+1 the equation 
(6) can be rewritten as:
( )1 1 1 1 1
1
bt
t t t t t
t
B
sr t g P b
P + + + + ++
= + − + (7)








π+ += +  or πt+1≡ (Pt+1-Pt)/ Pt then it can be rewritten 
as: 
Bt = (1 +πt+1) srt+1 + [(1 + πt+1)tt+1 – (1 + πt+1)
gt+1 + P
b
t+1 (1 + πt+1)bt+1
(8)
The equation (8) is GBC for the t+1 period. The 
equation (8) can be inserted into the period-t flow 
GBC, and using several algebraic manipulations GBC 
is formulated as:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11  1 1  b b b bt t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
B
sr P sr t g P t g P P b
P
−
+ + + + + + +   = + + + − + + − + +   π π π( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 11  1 1  
b b b bt
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
B
sr P sr t g P t g P P b
P
−
+ + + + + + +   = + + + − + + − + +   π π π
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11  1 1  b b b bt t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
B
sr P sr t g P t g P P b
P
−
+ + + + + + +   = + + + − + + − + +   π π π
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11  1 1  b b b bt t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
B
sr P sr t g P t g P P b
P
−
+ + + + + + +   = + + + − + + − + +   π π π
(9)
Bearing in mind the relation between the nominal price 









+ , and 









, than Chugh (2015:247) 













. Using the expression 
Pt
b(1+πt+1) the period-t GBC can be expressed as: 
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(10)
Finally, Chugh (2015:249) formulates the infinite-
period version of GBC as
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Chugh (2015: 249) states equation (11) as intertemporal 
government budget constraint (in the infinite-period 
version) from period t into the infinite future.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Chugh (2015: 241) states that in developed countries 
(in the author’s opinion in emerging countries as well), 
monetary policy-setting is effectively “independent” 
from fiscal policy-setting, in the sense that separate 
authorities control the two types of policies. Simorangkir 
(2007:6-7) argues there is a debate about independence 
between the two authorities. Some agree the monetary 
and fiscal policy must be coordinated with one another 
to obtain a positive impact on macroeconomic stability. 
Others argue that financing the fiscal deficit by the 
central bank as a result of the robust link between the 
government and the central bank can be harmful to 
the economy. The central bank can be dictated by the 
government to increase money to fiscal deficit funding. 
The experience of countries in Latin America in the late 
1980s and Indonesia in the 1960s shows that the fiscal 
deficits financing through the creation of new money 
results in hyperinflation and deep economic recession.
In practice, the government and central bank can 
coordinate the policies to achieve their goal. Chugh 
(2015: 244-245) states there are 2 conditions that can 
exist in coordination between two authorities: active 
fiscal authority and passive monetary authority, and 
active monetary policy and passive fiscal authority
Many studies of fiscal-monetary policy interaction 
have been performed using various methods in 
different countries. Simorangkir (2007) has studied 
the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in 
Indonesia covering the period from 1969 until 2002 by 
using the game theory approach, both in the form of 
the cooperative and non-cooperative game. Simulation 
results show that cooperative games provide the result 
of the smallest loss (lost function) compared with the 
non-cooperative game. In achieving that goal, they can 
either work together or not. Simulation results show 
that cooperative games provide the result of the smallest 
loss (lost function) compared with the non-cooperative 
game. This study differs from the research conducted 
by Simorangkir (2007) that used a game theory 
approach. This study is based on a dynamic equilibrium 
macroeconomic approach to study monetary-fiscal 
interaction.
Other studies conducted in Indonesia show that 
policy coordination is better suited to achieve optimal 
and effective fiscal and monetary policies rather 
than uncoordinated policies (Yunanto & Medyawati 
2013; Hermawan & Munro 2008; Rahutami 2011; 
Kuncoro et al. 2013; Mochtar 2004). Simorangkir & 
Adamanti (2010:169) state that the multiplier is high 
when monetary and fiscal coordination and monetary 
expansion have existed. On the other hand, Santoso 
(2011) and Simorangkir (2007) show the minimum 
social costs cause an economic shock when policies are 
coordinated. Yuan and Nuryakin (2018) employ a game 
theory, finding that in the 2014-2015 period the SBI 
rate and government spending produced a non-Nash 
balance and a non-Pareto efficiency balance. As such, 
there is plenty of room to improve policy, especially 
the arrangement of government spending throughout 
the year; that is, increasing absorption of government 
spending in the second quarter and moderating in the 
third and fourth quarters, as well as reducing the SBI 
rate.
The result of studies conducted in Indonesia 
supports the argument of Hall and Mankiw (1994) and 
Woodford (2001) which stated that coordination is 
better than having fiscal and monetary policies isolated 
from each other. Other studies made in various countries 
by Auerbach (2003), Favero and Monacelli (2005), 
Drazen (1985), Bruno and Fisher (1990), Blinder 
(1982), Tabellini (1986), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), 
and Janků and Kappel (2014) also find that coordination 
makes for a more effective fiscal and monetary policy.
The previous literature only studies the effect 
of the monetary and fiscal interaction on the policy 
objectives. None of them investigated the actual impact 
of the currency’s internal and external shock on the 
coordination itself. This study investigates the effect of 




The information of variables is defined in table 1. 
The variables are valued at a constant market price 
(2002=100). The real primary deficit (pd) is the central 
government’s expenditure (g) and the transfer payment 
to the province, district-city, and village (tr) minus 
real tax revenue (t). The real domestic debt (bd) and 
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external debt (bf) are the values of internal financing 
and gross foreign loans in a constant price. The real 
supply of money, m, is a real currency and demand 
deposit (M1). Finally, the exchange rate, K, is the 
value of the domestic currency per US Dollar (RP/
USD). The increase in the exchange rate means IDR 
or Rupiah (Rp) depreciation. The study uses quarterly 
data in 2001Q1-2016Q4.
METHODOLOGY
First, the empirical model is formulated to examine the 
interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities. The 
criteria measure the interaction, as can be seen in table 
2. There are three variables, the change of real primary 
deficit that is obtained by the formula ∆pdt = (gt–tt )–
(gt-1–tt-1), the change of real debt is obtained by formula 
∆bt = bt–bt-1 , and the change of seignorage revenue is 
obtained by formula ∆srt = srt–srt-1. There are two fiscal 
variables, ∆pdt-1 and ∆bt, and one monetary variable in 
the model, ∆srt. The increase of primary deficit demands 
the new debt, so the relation between ∆pd and ∆bt is 
expected to be positive. Furthermore, the rise of the debt 
also increases the interest rates that can be anticipated by 
the expansion of the money creation by seignorage. The 
coordination exists when there is a positive relationship 
between fiscal and monetary variables in the model (the 
complete explanation can be seen in Janků and Kappel 
(2014), Bianchi & Ilut (2017), and Bianchi and Melosi 
(2017, 2019)).
Janků and Kappel (2014:377) propose a method that 
shows the meaning of coefficients of reaction functions 
to describe the relationship between monetary and fiscal 
policies. Table 2 explains the expected relationships 
among variables in the model.
The author use the three-step procedure 
estimation made by Insukindro (2018: 78-79). 
TABLE 1. Definition of variables
Variables Description Unit Sources
Real Central government expenditure (g) Constant price 2002=100 Billion Rp MoF
Real tax revenue (t) Constant price 2002=100 Billion Rp MoF
Real transfer to province, district-city, and and 
village (tr)
Constant price 2002=100 Billion Rp MoF
Real primary deficit (pd) pd = g+tr-t Billion Rp MoF
Domestic debt (Bd) Domestic financing Billion Rp MoF
External debt (Bf) Withdrawal of gross external loans Billion Rp MoF
Government debt (B) Debt accumulation is started 2001Q1, b = bd+bf Billion Rp MoF
Real Government debt (b) Constant price 2002=100
Real supply of Money (m) Real currency and demand deposit Billion Rp BI
Seignorage revenue (Sr) srt = (Mt–Mt-1)⁄Pt Billion Rp BI
Price level (p) Consumer price index 2002=100 BPS
Trend of price level (p*) Obtaining by using HP Filter
Shock of price level (Sp) sp = p-p* Billion Rp
Exchange rate (K) Rp/USD Rp/USD BI
Value of exchange rate trend (K*) Obtaining by using HP Filter Rp/USD
Exchange rate shock (SK) SK = K-K* Rp/USD
BPS: Badan Pusat Statistik  (National Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia), MoF: Ministry of Finance; BI: Bank Indonesia (Central Bank of 
Indonesia)
TABLE 2. Estimated coefficients of the independent variables
Fiscal policy ∆pdt Fiscal policy ∆bt Monetary policy ∆srtt
Variable Expected relation Variable Expected relation Variable Expected relation
∆pdt-1 - ∆bt-1 - ∆srtt-1 -
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The first is a unit root test, namely the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, to find out whether the 
variables used in this study are stationary {I(0)} or 
not stationary {I(1)}. In the second step, the study 
used the Johansen Cointegration test to find the long-
run relationship among variables. Furthermore, if 
there is cointegration between variables, the Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) of monetary and 
fiscal reaction functions could be estimated to detect 
short-term relationships.  
The fiscal reaction function would be chosen based 
on the model monetary-fiscal authority interaction 
by Chugh (2015:245-249). The reaction function also 
considers the model that is developed by Wyplosz 
(1999), Melitz (2000), Janků and Kappel (2014), 
Asiama et al. (2014), and Insukindro (2018). The fiscal 
reaction function is stated as:
1 1 1 t i i t i i t i i t t t
i i i
pd L b L pd L sr L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε1 1 1 t i t i i t i t t t
i i i
pd L b L pd L sr L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 1 t i i t i i t i i t t t
i i i
pd L b L pd L sr L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
(12)
1 1 2t i i t i i t i i t t t
i i i
b L pd L b L sr L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε1 1 2t i i t i i t i i t t t
i i i
b L pd L b L sr L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 2t i i t i i t i i t t t
i i i
b L pd L b L sr L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
(13)
The basic monetary reaction function is compiled as:
1 1 3   t i i t i i t i i t t t
i i i
sr L pdD L sr L b L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε1 1 3   t i i t i i t i i t t t
i i i
sr L pdD L sr L b L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 3   t i i t i i t i i t t t
i i i
sr L pdD L sr L b L−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
(14)
The fiscal reaction function would be chosen based on the 
model monetary-fiscal authority interaction by Chugh 
(2015: 245-249). The reaction function also considers 
the model developed by Wyplosz (1999), Melitz (2000), 
Janků and Kappel (2014). The cointegration equation 
can be seen clearly in Insukindro (2018: 79). However, 
since three variables are used as well as the Johansen 
cointegration method, the cointegration equations 
are not shown in this study. Furthermore the γ is error 
correction term which must be -1<γ<0. The lack of 
the criterion of γ is the reason that the models show no 
convergence.
The study also estimates the fiscal and monetary 
reaction function with the shock variable (S) in equation 
(15), (16), and (17). The same procedure, adding 
shock variables in the ECM, has been employed by 
Cuthbertson (1988), Insukindro (1992), Insukindro & 
Sahadewo (2010), and Insukindro (2018).
1 1 1 2 4  t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
pd L b L pd L sr L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε1 1 1 2 4  t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
pd L b L pd L sr L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 1 2 4  t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
pd L b L pd L sr L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 1 2 4  t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
pd L b L pd L sr L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
(15)
1 1 1 2 5t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
b L pd L b L sr L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε1 1 1 2 5t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
b L pd L b L sr L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 1 2 5t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
b L pd L b L sr L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 1 2 5t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
b L pd L b L sr L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
(16)
1 1 1 2 6t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
srt L pd L sr L b L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε1 1 1 2 6t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
srt L pd L sr L b L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 1 2 6t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
srt L pd L sr L b L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
1 1 1 2 6t i i t i i t i i t t i t i t t
i i i
srt L pd L sr L b L e S e LS−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑a b b γ η ε
(17)
where e1i ∆St = e11 ∆spt+e12 ∆SKt and e2i LSt = e21 Lsp+e22 
LSKt, and L is the  lag operator. 
In the model with shock, the hypothesis testing runs 
as follows: 
Ho: e11= 0 Ho: e12 = 0 Ho: e21 = 0 Ho: e22 = 0
Ha: e11 ≠ 0 Ha: e12 ≠ 0 Ha: e21 ≠ 0 Ha: e22 ≠ 0
Insukindro (2018: 80) states that if only e11 and 
e12 are different from zero and statistically significant, 
it means that shock occurred only in the short term. 
However, if only e21 and e22 are different from zero and 
statistically significant, it means shocks continuously 
occur for the long term. The study uses the shock of price 
level since monetary authority attaches importance to it. 
Furthermore, the study uses the shock of the exchange 
rate in the model since it is important for government 
debt financing and the external value of Rupiah (IDR) 
that is a matter of concern for the central bank, namely 
Bank Indonesia.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
The first step to examine the interaction between the 
fiscal and monetary policy is the stationary test of 
variables. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
has been employed to find whether the variables are 
stationary, I(0), or not stationary I(1). The percentages 
of α=5% or α=1% have been used in the test.
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Based on the ADF test, with α=5% or α=1%, it can 
be concluded that the real primary deficit, pdt, the real 
government debt, bt, and the seignorage revenue are not 
stationary, I(1). 
The Johansen method is used, in the next step, to 
test the cointegration. The estimation results in Table 4 
reports that the Johansen cointegration test includes trace 
statistic and maximum Eigenvalue. The trace statistic 
shows the possibility of long-term relationships or 
cointegration. However, the Max-eigenvalue indicates 
no cointegration at the 0.05 level. 
Based on the estimation, it can be concluded 
that there is one cointegration equation. The ADF 
and Johansen cointegration results indicate that the 
consolidated government budget constraint (GBC) 
means there are links between fiscal authority (taxing, 
spending, and issuing the bond) and the monetary 
authority (changing supply of money) activities (Chugh 
2015: 243) in the long-run. The result is consistent 
with the previous studies that show there are long-run 
relations between fiscal and monetary policy.
Since all variables are I(1) and cointegration 
exists, the fiscal and monetary reaction function can be 
estimated using VECM to find out the appropriate short-
term relationship between the three variables. The fiscal 
and monetary reaction functions are estimated using 
equations (12), (13), and (14).
The Error Correction Model (ECM) has been 
selected using the criteria that the coefficient of the lag 
residual of cointegrating regression or error correction 
term (η) is between -1 and 0 as well as statistically 
significant. The following Table 5 shows the estimated 
results of the VECM of the fiscal reaction function and 
monetary reaction function. The error correction term 
(η) coefficient for both the fiscal reaction function is 
between 0 and -1 and is statistically significant (for 
regression ∆pdt, the regression coefficient = -0.7147 
and its t-statistic = -2.97111 as well as for the regression 
coefficient = -0.4559 and its t-statistic = -2.81696). 
However, the error correction term (η) for monetary 
reaction function is also between 0 and -1 but it is not 
statistically significant (regression coefficient = -0.2708 
and its t-statistic =-1.64060). 
The result indicates there is only a fiscal reaction 
function that shows convergence in the short run. The 
shock of the variables is adjusted if different from the 
equilibrium in the long run. However, the monetary 
reaction function shows that the shock of variables is 
not significantly adjusted in the long run.
Furthermore, both fiscal reaction functions and 
monetary reaction functions with shock variables, price 
shock, and exchange rate shock have been re-estimated, 
as shown in table 6. The fiscal reaction functions and 
monetary reaction function with shock are estimated 
using equations (15), (16), and (17). Table 6 shows 
the error correction term (η) for both fiscal reaction 
functions is between 0 and -1 and statistically significant 
(for regression ∆pdt, regression coefficient = -0.99743 
and its t-statistic = -4.4107 as well as for the regression 
coefficient = -0.345 and its t-statistic =-2.01067). 
Furthermore, the coefficient η for monetary reaction 
function is also between 0 and -1 and statistically 
TABLE 3. Stationary test
pdt bt srt
t-stat -3.4736 -0.4393 -3.0170
Prob. 0.0515 0.9839 0.1364
Δpdt Δbt Δsrt
t-stat -8.5896** -8.7672** -16.1312**
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
The variable is stationer  at  *(**) α=5% (1%),









Eigen value 0.2807 0.2199 0.1574
Trace statistic 44.1915* 24.7560 10.1074
Max. Eigen value 19.4355 14.6486 10.1074
Critical value (5%):
Trace Statistic 42.9152 25.8721 12.5180
Max-Eigen Stat. 19.4355 14.6486 10.1074
*(**) indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis (no cointegration) at 5% (1%) of significance level.  The author assume there are intercept and 
linier deterministic trends in the cointegration equation (CE).
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significant (regression coefficient =-0.506 and its 
t-statistic =-3.31297). All reaction functions meet the 
criteria of ECM that the coefficient of cointegrating 
regression residual or η is between -1 and 0 as well as 
being statistically significant. The result shows that both 
the fiscal authority and monetary authority pay attention 
to the shock of the value of the domestic currency.
The sign of all coordination coefficient hypothesized 
in table 2 is confirmed by table 6 that shows the existence 
of the coordination among fiscal (primary deficit) and 
monetary authorities in the short run. Furthermore, 
monetary policy plays a dominant role in the interaction 
between the monetary policy and the movement of 
the debt. The result is similar to the study of Janků & 
Kappel (2014). The result also finds the shock of price 
and exchange rate make the monetary reaction function 
converge.
The Granger causality based on VECM without 
shock variable (table 5) and with shock variable (table 
6) is estimated and presented in table 7. The result 
shows that the shock variables make the model better 
than without shock variables to explain the relationship 
between fiscal and monetary variables since the 
signification of the causality relation is better with the 
shock. The VECM with shock variable shows there is 
bi-directional causality between ∆srt and ∆pdt. Table 
6 also shows the positive coefficient of the causality 
relationship. The result indicates there is coordination 
between the primary deficit and seignorage in the short 
run. 
The Granger causality based on VECM with twin 
shock also shows the causality relation from ∆srt to 
∆bt. The positive coefficient from ∆srt to ∆bt shows 
that the increase of money (that reduces interest rates) 
will increase the government debt. The result also 
indicates the bi-directional causality between ∆pdt and 
∆bt. The VECM coefficient with twin shock shows that 
the increase of primary deficit will increase the debt. 
However, the increased debt will decrease the primary 
deficit.










Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
η -0.7147** -2.97111 -0.4559** -2.81696 -0.2708 -1.64060
Δpdt-1 -0.3827 -1.86406 0.4289** 3.10462 0.1624 1.15288
Δpdt-2 -0.5266** -2.8557 0.2936* 2.3661 -0.1232 -0.9740
Δpdt-2 -0.6474** -5.0135 0.0340 0.3909 -0.1569 -1.7707
Δbt-1 -0.3094 -1.4655 -0.0319 -0.2246 0.0324 0.2237
Δbt-2 -0.1888 -0.9157 0.1597 1.1512 -0.0845 -0.5970
Δbt-3 -0.3166 -1.5234 -0.1365 -0.9759 -0.1377 -0.9657
Δsrt-1 0.6897* 1.9994 0.5026* 2.1654 -0.878** -3.7094
Δsrt-2 0.3648 1.2828 0.4405* 2.3018 -0.5762** -2.9529
Δsrt-3 0.2314 1.1963 0.3039* 2.3346 -0.454** -3.4204
C 15716.4* 2.4327 18114.64** 4.1671 3860.047 0.8708
Adj. R2 0.8212 0.2068 0.8679
Sum sq. res. 211E+8 954E+7 992E+7
S.E. eq. 20950.2600 14096.8900 14375.5600
F-statistic 27.6382 2.5123 39.1202
*(**) indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% (1%) of the significance level . The author assume there are intercept and linier 
deterministic trends in the cointegration equation (CE).
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TABLE 6. Result of VECM with shock 
Cointegration Equation:








Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
η -0.99743** -4.4107 -0.345* -2.01067 -0.506** -3.31297
Δpdt-1 -0.09694 -0.47022 0.332376* 2.12491 0.362192* 2.60133
Δpdt-2 -0.24327 -1.28347 0.211473 1.47042 0.033948 0.26518
Δpdt-2 -0.50461** -4.09226 -0.01541 -0.16464 -0.0857 -1.029
Δbt-1 -0.33096 -1.74278 -0.01243 -0.08625 -0.062 -0.48341
Δbt-2 -0.22657 -1.23815 0.232033 1.67113 -0.09235 -0.74722
Δbt-3 -0.30708 -1.58176 -0.16486 -1.11918 -0.20111 -1.53381
Δsrt-1 1.620089** 3.49226 0.711786* 2.02213 -0.18198 -0.58079
Δsrt-2 0.872193** 2.72335 0.577862* 2.37798 -0.22013 -1.01769
Δsrt-3 0.411615* 2.05384 0.416159** 2.7367 -0.26683 -1.9713
C 16984.29** 2.98349 16887.63** 3.90966 6725.181 1.74912
ΔSpt 1198.374 0.93029 -1861.9 -1.90491 -2183.27* -2.50941
Spt-1 -1592.24 -1.43414 -605.227 -0.71844 -1729.21* -2.30604
ΔSKt 7.019651 1.25738 0.065464 0.01545 -5.12368 -1.35885
ΔSKt-1 -10.912* -2.36651 2.366339 0.67635 -2.40242 -0.77142
Adj. R2 0.858579 0.202255 0.898805
Sum sq. res. 1.53E+10 8.79E+09 6.97E+09
S.E. eq. 18632.08 14137.38 12584.12
F-statistic 26.15158 2.050355 37.7964
0.858579 0.202255 0.898805
*(**) indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% (1%) of the significance level. The author assume there are intercept and linear 
deterministic trends in the cointegration equation (CE).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The study has established the role of twin shock, the 
shock of the price level and the exchange rate in the 
fiscal and monetary interaction. Significant interaction 
was observed when the twin shock entered the model. 
Furthermore, without twin shock, the short-run 
monetary policy reaction function is not convergent. The 
study shows that the primary deficit is affected by long-
run exchange rate shock. The currency depreciation 
reduces the primary deficit since it increases the cost of 
deficit financing. Furthermore, the monetary policy is 
influenced by the shock of the price level in the short 
run and long run since the central bank’s objective is 
price stability.
The study has found the long run and the short-
run relationship between fiscal and monetary variables 
in Indonesia. The research shows the existence of 
consolidated government budget constraint (GBC) that 
links the activity of fiscal authority (taxing, spending, 
and issuing bonds) with the behavior of monetary 
authority in the long run. The GBC condition in the 
economy makes the monetary and fiscal authority 
consistent with each other. 
The result also shows there is short-run coordination 
between fiscal and monetary policy in Indonesia. The 
coordination can be discerned in the relation between 
short-run primary deficit and monetary policy. The 
debt is issued to finance the primary deficit as well as 
the government’s stabilizing it when it increases by 
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reducing the primary deficit. There also uni-direction 
causality from monetary policy to the debt. The increase 
of primary deficit and government debt is stabilized by 
monetary policy by making monetary expansion. The 
study supports Bianchi & Ilut (2017: 138), and Bianchi 
& Melosi (2017: 1055, 2019: 16)) which state that the 
monetary authority can coordinate with the government 
to stabilize the budget used in their policy. The result of 
the study also supports the previous research conducted 
in Indonesia by Simorangkir (2007), Yunanto and 
Medyawati (2013), Hermawan and Munro (2008), 
Rahutami (2011), Kuncoro et al. (2013), Mochtar 
(2004), Simorangkir and Adamanti (2010), and Yuan 
and Nuryakin (2018).
The study shows the importance of coordination 
between fiscal and monetary policies. The monetary 
policy helps the government manage the cost of deficit 
financing by the money and interest rates policy as well 
as exchange rates management. The government must 
also coordinate with the central bank in the primary 
deficit and debt management since it affects the inflation 
and exchange rate.
This study still uses a backward-looking 
approach. In reality, the behavior of policymakers is 
not only based on past information but also relies on 
future prospects. Policymakers can coordinate based 
on the expectation of what policies other authorities 
will take in the future (forward-looking approach). To 
carry out a study of forward-looking coordination, the 
author must develop different models and estimation 
techniques.
NOTES
1. The fluctuation describes the gap ratio of the 
variable to their trend (long-run movement). The 








where x is the actual value of x and is the value 
of the trend. The trend of the variable is estimated 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter).
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